The Multiple Roles of International Courts and Tribunals: Enforcement, Dispute Settlement, Constitutional and Administrative Review by Alter, Karen J.
Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Working Papers
2012
The Multiple Roles of International Courts and
Tribunals: Enforcement, Dispute Settlement,
Constitutional and Administrative Review
Karen J. Alter
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Repository Citation
Alter, Karen J., "The Multiple Roles of International Courts and Tribunals: Enforcement, Dispute Settlement, Constitutional and




Buffett Center for International and Comparative Studies 





The Multiple Roles of International Courts 
and Tribunals: Enforcement, Dispute 
Settlement, Constitutional and 
Administrative Review 
 
Karen J. Alter 




















The Roberta Buffett Center for 




The Multiple Roles of International Courts and Tribunals: Enforcement, Dispute 
Settlement, Constitutional and Administrative Review 
By Karen J. Alter 
 To	  be	  published	  in	  Jeffrey	  L.	  Dunoff	  and	  Mark	  A.	  Pollack,	  eds.	  	  International	  Law	  and	  International	  
Relations:	  Synthesizing	  Insights	  from	  Interdisciplinary	  Scholarship	  (Cambridge:	  	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  forthcoming	  2013).	  
 
As this volume demonstrates, scholarly interest in international law’s intersection with 
international politics is growing. Much international law scholarship excludes international 
courts from the conversation, dismissing as irrelevant or dysfunctional the international legal 
institutions that elaborate and help enforce the law. The proliferation, rising usage and growing 
political importance of international courts (ICs) around the world makes this standard 
disclaimer increasingly less viable. Many domains of international law—international economic 
law, human rights law, criminal law, administrative law, and even constitutional law—have 
become judicialized. The judicialization of international relations occurs when courts gain 
authority to define what the law means and where litigation becomes a useful way to reopen 
political agreements. Negotiations among actors become debates about what is legally 
permissible, and politics takes place in the shadow of courts with the lurking possibility of 
litigation shaping actor demands and political outcomes.   
In an effort to broaden the debate about the role of international courts in the international 
legal system, this chapter draws from a study of the universe of operational international courts, 
examining ICs as a category of actors. Section I gives an overview the international judicial 
order as it exists today. Section II describes the four roles that states have delegated to 
international courts. The enforcement role has ICs assessing state compliance with international 
law. The administrative review role involves ICs reviewing the decisions of administrative actors 
in cases raised by private litigants. The constitutional review role has courts assessing the legal 
validity of legislative and government actions vis-à-vis higher order legal obligations. The 
dispute settlement role is perhaps the broadest judicial role, in that ICs have the general authority 
to issue binding interpretations in any dispute that is brought. After defining the four roles, I map 
these roles onto the universe of international courts in operation as of 2006, reporting the result 
of a coding of the statutes where the jurisdictions of the twenty-five international courts are 
defined.  
Section III reflects on what the multiple roles of ICs tell us about two debates in the 
international law and international relations scholarship. I use the four roles to argue that courts 
can be either agents of states or trustees of law, depending on the judicial role. We might perhaps 
perceive of ICs as agents and states as principals in other-binding judicial roles, although it 
probably makes more sense to see international judicial oversight as a policy tool used by states 
to monitor others.  But for self-binding judicial roles, such as constitutional review and 
enforcement, I stick to the argument that ICs are better conceived of as trustees of the law. I 
build on this distinction between self-binding and other-binding delegation to ICs to argue that 
especially where ICs are monitoring the behavior of other actors, compliance concerns recede in 
importance. I then apply the four-role typology to debates about IC design, arguing that the 
multiple roles of ICs helps us understand why most ICs today have design features that 
undermine states’ ability to control which cases get litigated. Section IV concludes by 
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considering what the four roles of ICs mean for concerns about how delegation to international 
courts perhaps undermines domestic democracy.  
I. The Twenty-First Century International Judicial Order  
I am interested in how creating international judicial bodies affects international relations. 
My study approaches the international judiciary in holistic terms, allowing us to see common 
political dynamics at play across international legal bodies. I use the Project on International 
Court and Tribunal’s definition of an international court,1 focusing on permanent international 
courts because their permanence combines with the public nature of their rulings to potentially 
create a stronger shadow of the law that can affect international affairs and state decision-
making, but I recognize that decisions of quasi legal and ad hoc bodies can also be authoritative 
and politically important. This section reports some of the basic descriptive findings from my 
study of twenty-five operational ICs.2 
As of 2006, twenty-five permanent international courts were operational, meaning the 
statutes defining IC’s jurisdictions had been ratified, judges appointed and the courts were ready 
to receive legal complaints.3 Figure 1 identifies the twenty-five permanent ICs considered in this 
analysis, organized by the year the court became operational (in parenthesis).4 Four of these legal 
bodies are global in reach—the International Court of Justice, International Tribunal of the Law 
of the Seas (ITLOS), the appellate body of the World Trade Organization, and the International 
Criminal Court.  The rest are regional bodies located in Africa (9 ICs), Europe (6 ICs), Latin 
America (5 ICs) and Asia (1 IC). These bodies have jurisdiction to hear cases involving 
economic disputes (17 ICs), human rights issues (5 ICs), and war crimes (3 ICs) and/or the 
courts have a general jurisdiction that allows them to adjudicate any case involving any issue 
where plaintiffs have legal standing to invoke the court (9 ICs). A court can be listed more than 
once if its subject matter jurisdiction extends beyond a single category. I indicate a second listing 
by using the acronym only.  
                                                
1 http://www.pict-pcti.org/ last visited 20 September 2011. 
2 For a through explanation of the data sources and coding criteria, see Alter (forthcoming). 
3 Not all of these courts are particularly active, but I want my sample to include all ICs that can receive cases today. 
The figure does not include at least seven other formally constituted ICs that appear to be dormant, and six hybrid 
domestic/international criminal tribunals. For the full listing of active and inactive ICs see: http://www.pict-
pcti.org/publications/synoptic_chart.html. This material is updated in Romano 2011. 
4 The founding dates of ICs are actually not easy to pinpoint, as there may be significant time gaps between when 
states agree to create an IC, when they ratify the necessary treaties and when the court is actually created.  For 
example, the founding protocol for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) court was drafted 
in 1991, ratified in 1995, and became binding in 1996. Yet only in 2001 were judges appointed and rules of 
procedure created. For well-known ICs, I rely on the date that most people know as the founding date of an IC.  For 
less known ICs, I use the date when the first set of judges assumed office. 
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Figure 1: Region and Subject Matter Distribution of Active ICs (year IC became operational) 
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N=25 ICs 
*CCJ’s de facto human rights jurisdiction applies to countries that allow the CCJ to replace the Privy 
Council as the highest court of appeals. 
 
The “new” ICs in the sample are not only recent creations; they are qualitatively different 
entities. I give the name “old style” ICs to international courts that lack compulsory jurisdiction. 
When an IC’s jurisdiction is not compulsory, states can decide whether to submit to an IC 
authority on a case-by-case basis.  “New style” ICs have compulsory jurisdiction and access for 
nonstate actors to initiate litigation, design features that make them far more likely to be 
activated and to issue judgments in cases in which states are unwilling participants. Of the 
twenty-five permanent ICs operational as of 2006, twenty-two (88%) have at least partial 
compulsory jurisdiction, seventeen (68%) allow international institutional actors to initiate 
binding litigation, and fifteen (60%) have provisions that allow private actors to initiate 
litigation.  These design features explain in part why IC usage has also increased. By the end of 
2009, international courts had issued over twenty-seven thousand binding legal rulings. Eighty-
eight percent of the total IC output of decisions, opinions, and rulings were issued since the end 
of the Cold War (1989). Figure 2 below shows the increased usage of ICs since the end of the 
Cold War.  The data includes binding rulings in concrete cases (excluding advisory decisions, 
interim rulings, appellate decisions and rulings in staff cases). The figure excludes the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) and European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) so as to better see the 
growth in litigation by all ICs. Before the end of the Cold War, there were five permanent ICs in 
addition to the ECJ and ECtHR—the International Court of Justice (created 1945), the 
BENELUX court (created 1974), the Inter-American Court of Justice (created 1979), and the 
Andean Tribunal of Justice (created 1984). While it lacked a permanent judicial body the WTO’s 
precursor body (the dispute settlement system of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)) also existed, and I include panel rulings from the GATT era in this count. The first 
column includes the sum of all international judicial rulings in these five international legal 
bodies through 1989. The rest of the figure includes litigation for each post-Cold war year from 
the twenty operational ICs for which I could find data. After the ECJ and ECtHR, the next most 
active courts are the Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ) (1786 rulings), the OHADA court (358 
rulings) and IACtHR (193 rulings) and the WTO legal system (117 GATT era panel rulings, 158 
WTO era panel rulings) issued by the end of 2009.  
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Binding rulings from the IC’s founding through 1989. Source: (Alter, forthcoming)  
 
If we take litigation as a sign of legal demand, we can see a growing number of litigants 
seizing ICs in an attempt to influence legal and political outcomes.  But we can also see from the 
narrow bands on the graph that many of the ICs are not very active often despite having the same 
design as some of the more active ICs. Sometimes low levels of activity are easily explained. 
Some ICs have small memberships and some oversee a small set of binding rules. Low levels of 
litigation are also to be expected in the first years of an IC’s existence. The level of activity and 
influence of Europe’s Court of Justice and Court of Human Rights today make all other ICs pale 
in comparison; we forget that initially these two ICs were not all that different from today’s new 
ICs. In their first twenty years the European Court of Justice issued only 884 and the European 
Court of Human Rights only 31 rulings. The lesson: establishing international judicial authority 
takes time even in the best of circumstances (Alter 2011a).   
 
II. The Four Roles of International Courts: Enforcement, Administrative Review, 
Constitutional Review and Dispute Settlement 
Most of us are familiar with a small handful of international legal bodies and their 
rulings. These examples loom large in our minds, often defining our understanding of 
international courts. In keeping with the holistic approach to studying ICs as actors, this section 
discusses the formal mandates of international courts. IC jurisdictions are defined in treaties, 
which can be amended over time. There are separate treaty provisions for each jurisdictional role 
defining which actors can raise cases, the types of remedies the IC can order, and in some cases 
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the scope of legal review that is allowed.5  I begin by defining each role, offering examples from 
international legal systems around the world. While ICs can end up playing roles that they were 
never officially delegated, it is nonetheless helpful to understand what states have tasked ICs to 
do. The jurisdictional grants define the domains of international judges, sending important 
signals to litigants and thereby shaping the types of legal suits that are raised and the arguments 
of advocates. Also, the formal grants of jurisdiction represent relative safe zones for ICs, where 
the assertion of jurisdiction is least credibly contested and where defenders are most likely to 
rally in support of an IC ruling. Examining IC jurisdictions reveals that ICs have been delegated 
a broader set of tasks than many people realize.   
International Law Enforcement 
Twenty of the twenty-five ICs (80%) operational as of 2006 have been formally 
empowered to oversee state compliance with international rules. The enforcement role involves 
ICs reviewing the actions of states, public bodies and in some cases individuals to see if they 
cohere with the requirements of international law. ICs primarily name a state practice as legal or 
illegal, and secondarily authorize remedies designed to compensate victims and create costs 
associated with illegal behavior. For example, the Court of the Economic Community of West 
African States found that Niger’s government failed to protect Hadidjatou Mani from modern-
day enslavement, and it awarded her $120,000 which the government immediately paid (Duffy, 
2009). The court’s contribution to this case was to name the family law practices upheld by 
national courts as creating the conditions of enslavement, and to specify a remedy.6  ICs are not 
unique in primarily flagging noncompliance. Indeed no court actually enforces its rulings or the 
remedies judges create. Rather judges rely on their own authority to encourage compliance, and, 
if that fails, on the power of others to bring coercive pressure to bear. At the domestic level, one 
can assume that governments will provide support for the enforcement of domestic court rulings 
because national judges are helping to enforce state law, and because coercive power will be 
employed against individual subjects of the law and not the sovereign itself. With the expectation 
that states will enforce legal rulings, there is perhaps an assumption of coercion behind national 
legal rulings. Clearly this assumption does not hold internationally. For most people this 
difference, namely the lack of any international governmental apparatus to enforce IC rulings 
against states, makes international law unlike domestic law. But as others have pointed out, the 
situation of ICs is analogous to the constitutional and public law roles of courts in domestic 
realm (Goldsmith and Levinson 2009;  Hathaway and Shapiro 2011).  
As scholars have noted, there are many good reasons for states to commit to international 
judicial oversight. States might self-bind because they do not trust that future governments will 
stick to international agreements (Elster 2000). Especially where actors have little faith in 
national judicial checks, agreeing to international judicial oversight can send a helpful signal to 
foreign investors, international institutions, foreign governments and to the broader public that 
the government is seriously committed to respecting international covenants (Cooley and Spruyt 
2009;  Ikenberry 2001;  Moravcsik 1997). Political leaders may also prefer that disinterested 
international judges, rather than actors in powerful Western countries or lawyers appointed 
jointly with private firms, review their compliance with international rules. At least some of 
these reasons should span time, yet delegating ICs an enforcement role is largely a post-Cold 
                                                
5 Figure 3 below reports on the result of coding the treaties where IC’s jurisdictional mandates are defined. 
6 Hadidjatou	  Mani	  Koraou	  	  v.	  The	  Republic	  of	  Niger,	  ECOWAS	  Case	  No.	  ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08	  (Oct.	  27,	  2008). 
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War phenomenon. Indeed it is more accurate to say that for many years, states showed an 
aversion to committing to the compulsory authority of ICs preferring instead to require that states 
first consent before a case proceeded to court (Levi 1976: 70-1). Of the five enforcement systems 
in existence before the end of the Cold War, only the European Court of Justice had compulsory 
jurisdiction for its enforcement role.  Since the end of the Cold War, however, states have 
enhanced the enforcement role of many ICs by making their jurisdiction compulsory, and 
allowing nonstate actors—supranational commissions, prosecutors, and private litigants—to 
initiate litigation that reviews state compliance with international law (Alter 2011a).  
Today one finds international courts with enforcement authority in all substantive areas 
where ICs operate. Economic regimes are increasingly likely to include an enforcement role for 
ICs.  Systems modeled on the World Trade Organization (WTO) (including the enforcement 
system for Mercosur and ASEAN) rely on other states to initiate litigation. Most of the other 
economic enforcement systems follow the model of the European Court of Justice, often 
allowing supranational commissions, private litigants or both to challenge state noncompliance 
with community rules (Alter 2012). Human rights systems have changed over time. The Inter-
American and African Union systems still rely on politically attuned Commissions to vet which 
cases reach the court. The European Court of Human Rights and ECOWAS systems, by contrast, 
now allow private litigants to initiate litigation directly wherever national actions arguably 
violate international human rights statutes.  International criminal courts rely on independent 
prosecutors to raise non-compliance cases. Unlike economic and human rights courts that review 
policies and actions undertaken under the color of state authority, international criminal courts 
target specific individuals, holding them accountable for committing war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.  
 
International Administrative Review 
ICs with administrative review authority hear challenges to the decisions of 
administrative actors in cases raised by individuals whom the administration’s decisions affect.7 
Depending on the standard of review, the judge will be checking to make sure that the 
administrative decision is faithful to the law, that the administrative decision-maker followed 
prescribed procedures, and that the administrator had legally defensible reasons for its decision. 
As of 2006, there were 12 permanent ICs with administrative review authority (48% of ICs).  
One finds international administrative review jurisdiction primarily in international economic 
arenas where there are supranational regulatory rules and/or supranational administrators charged 
with implementing international regulatory rules. 
The reason to delegate administrative review authority is to monitor the behavior of 
administrative actors, who themselves rely on delegated authority.  At the international level 
administrative review has two forms. ICs can be authorized to hear challenges to the decisions of 
international organization (IO) administrators, like the European Commission or the 
International Seabed Authority, or charges that IO administrators failed to act where they were 
legally required to do so. This type of administrative review usually does not compromise 
national sovereignty; indeed it arguably keeps supranational administrators faithful to member 
state intent.  
                                                
7 Within the specialized world of ICs, the title of  “administrative courts” is given to specialized bodies that hear 
labor disputes involving international employees. Instead, I am interested in international adjudicatory systems that 
replicate what occurs within domestic administrative review systems. 
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ICs can also review the decisions of national administrators who are charged with 
implementing international regulatory rules. For example, the ECJ, BCJ, and Andean courts 
regularly review national application of common regulatory rules. Where states creatively 
interpret international rules to promote national policy objectives, international administrative 
review may serve as a sort of international enforcement system for regulatory decision-making. 
But more often than not international administrative review is not seen as encroaching on 
national prerogatives. IC review helps to facilitate a uniform interpretation of transnational 
regulatory rules, providing guidance for domestic administrators and judges regarding new and 
complex technical legal issues. It provides a legal redress for private actors that fails as often if 
not more than it succeeds, thereby helping states defend their actions against firm claims of 
illegalities. For developing countries especially, but even in developed country contexts, it can be 
helpful to have an IC certify a domestic action as legal or shoulder the blame when a ruling 
disappoints firms. In the Andean context, the Andean Tribunal’s clarification of ambiguous 
Andean intellectual property rules, its requirement that national administrations give reasons for 
their rulings, and its willingness to assert the supremacy of Andean rules has ended up improving 
national administrative decision-making regarding intellectual property issues, and it has helped 
national intellectual property administrators push back against the political efforts to compromise 
Andean patent requirements (Helfer, Alter, and Guerzovich 2009: 21-5). 
 
International Constitutional Review 
Constitutional review authority is the judicial authority to invalidate laws and 
government acts on the basis of a conflict with higher order legal obligations (Stone Sweet 2000: 
21). In the international arena, the higher order laws are usually the founding treaties that 
“constitute” supranational political systems and they may also include basic rights protections of 
member states (Dunoff and Trachtman 2009). There are ten ICs with the formal authority to 
review the validity of international legislative enactments. Most of these ICs are located within 
common market systems, where there are supranational political bodies empowered to draft and 
agree to international policies that may be directly binding on member states.  
Constitutional review vis-à-vis international acts is a very clear category.  But some 
scholars see IC review of state acts as having a potential constitutional significance. International 
trade agreements may be elevated to a form of higher order law, which takes precedence over 
conflicting national laws and policies. Human rights law is often seen as a higher order legal 
obligation, so that the enforcement of international human rights agreements may be seen as 
largely analogous to constitutional review of state acts.  And international criminal law can be 
seen as creating a higher order limit on what states are allowed to do as they exercise their 
monopoly on the legitimate use of force.  
Such claims are controversial for a number of reasons. When ICs enforce what are 
arguably higher order international laws, they mainly authorize compensation for victims or 
authorize the punishment of individuals responsible for gross human rights violations. The 
contested domestic law or policy may even remain legally valid within the national system. 
While constitutional law scholars may see analogies between what ICs do and the award of 
compensation by Supreme Courts, most people expect constitutional courts to be able to nullify 
illegal state acts. ICs are, in fact, able to nullify illegal international acts.  But IC rulings 
regarding domestic acts do not invalidate “illegal” national acts. Moreover, many states comply 
fully with IC rulings by paying compensation while still maintaining the contested practice.  
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ICs are also considered to be constitutional bodies because of their ability to develop law 
of constitutional import (Dunoff and Trachtman 2009). The emergence of what might be seen as 
morphed international constitutional roles with respect to state actions depends, however, on how 
domestic actors view international legal rulings. If governments or judges see ICs as 
authoritative, and the laws they apply as supreme, then ICs may be able to foster a culture of 
constitutional obedience where state acts condemned by ICs are seen as ipso facto invalid.8 Like 
national constitutional courts, the IC will be unable to compel compliance with its rulings and 
thus it will rely on evolving public opinion and national mobilization to pressure political actors 
to respect its rulings (Epps 1998). But where national cultures of international law adherence 
emerge, national legislators and judges may voluntarily vacate state policies that run afoul of 
higher order international laws.9  
 
International Dispute Settlement  
International dispute settlement via courts is the archetypical role of ICs. Pretty much all 
international treaties include provisions for dispute settlement. Usually the parties can choose 
non-legalized dispute settlement (e.g. arbitration, mediation, good offices), but a specific body is 
named as final venue for settling disputes regarding the agreement (often the International Court 
of Justice or a regional court). Legalized dispute settlement differs from non-legalized forms in 
that a pre-determined set of judges decide cases based on standing law; the court’s ruling will 
usually be publicly pronounced, binding, and available for non-parties to peruse; and public 
rulings at least potentially defines a legal precedent that can be used going forward. Most often 
dispute settlement is triggered by states.  But there are some international agreements that allow 
firms to initiate international dispute settlement to claim rights that exist as part of international 
treaties.10  
Most dispute settlement systems are part of an economic and general jurisdiction system. 
War crimes bodies and human rights bodies do not include dispute settlement provisions.  The 
ICJ and the ITLOS also have interstate disputes settlement jurisdiction, and if states consent the 
ITLOS system can be invoked by private actors to resolve disputes regarding the seizing of 
vessels. Figure 3 below shows that most of the economic systems with dispute adjudication 
authority also have enforcement, administrative review and constitutional review authority. 
While the ICs have jurisdiction to hear any case that is validly brought, access rules clearly 
expect that most disputes will involve enforcement or challenges to the validity of community 
acts and thus the other roles of the IC. Dispute settlement in these institutions tends to be reduced 
to contract disputes with international institutions. Thus what might be seen as the paradigmatic 
role of ICs may actually be a secondary or tertiary role for the IC within its legal order. The 
exception to this argument is the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa.  
This system envisions that private actors will appeal disputes involving the multilateral “Uniform 
Acts” which govern business transactions within member states. 
International dispute settlement can either be non-compulsory—something that both 
parties must agree to for the case to advance—or compulsory. Where ICs have compulsory 
                                                
8 The term constitutional obedience comes from Phelan (2008). 
9 National judges may also serve as filters pushing back against international law encroachments so as to regulate 
the effects of global governance on domestic constitutional orders (Alter 2001;  Benvenisti 2008;  Maduro 2009). 
10 For example, virtually all recent bilateral investment treaties and investment chapters of regional trade 
agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, contain provisions authorizing private parties to 
trigger the establishment of ad hoc arbitral panels that review whether state actions are consistent with their treaty 
obligations (Franck 2007;  Goldstein 2006). 
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jurisdiction, dispute settlement can become a tool used to enforce the agreement and thus the 
IC’s dispute settlement role can morph into an enforcement role. Eighteen of the twenty-five 
operational ICs have been delegated dispute settlement authority (72%); of these thirteen were 
also delegated the authority to oversee state compliance with the law (e.g. enforcement 
authority). This overlap helps explain why most ICs with dispute settlement authority have 
compulsory jurisdiction for this role. 
 
Mapping the Delegation of Judicial Roles Across ICs 
Figure 3 reports on the coding of the formally delegated roles of today’s operational ICs. 
The treaties where IC jurisdictions are defined allow more than one role to be delegated to a 
single court. X indicates that the IC has formally been delegated a given power, meaning that 
international treaties and protocols explicitly authorize the court to play a given role.  I list ICs 
by their primary subject matter jurisdiction, but the Caribbean Court of Justice and the Court of 
Justice of the Economic Community of West African states also have human rights jurisdictions. 
I also note the cases where scholars see ICs having morphed roles.  Judges can engage in judicial 
law-making in all four roles, but it is interesting to note that the places where scholars often 
suggest that IC’s roles have expanded seem to be more the exception than the rule.   
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Figure 3: The Four Judicial Roles Delegated to ICs (within category by year IC created) 








Economic systems     
European Court of Justice (ECJ)/Tribunal of First Instance 
(TFI) (1952/1988) 
X X X X  and  
Morphed role? 
Benelux Court (BCJ) (1974) X  X  
Andean Tribunal Of Justice (ATJ) (1984) X X X X 
Economic Court of the Common- Wealth of Independent 
States (ECCIS) (1993) 
X    
Central American Court of Justice (CACJ) (1994) X X X X 
European Free Trade Area Court (EFTAC) (1992) X X X  
World Trade Organization Permanent Appellate Body 
(WTO) (1994) 
X X  Morphed role? 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 
(1994) 
X X X X 
Common Court of Justice and Arbitration for the 
Organization for the Harmonization of Corporate Law in 






Court of Justice for the Common Market of Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA) (1998) 
X X X X 
Central African Monetary Community (CEMAC)(2000) X X X X 
East African Community Court of Justice (EACJ) (2001) X X X X 
Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) (2001)* X  X X 
Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) (2001)* 
X X X X 
Southern Common Market (Mercosur) (2002) X X   
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Dispute 
Settlement Mechanisms (ASEAN) (2004) 
X X   
Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
(2005) 
X X  X 
Human rights*     
European Court of Human Rights  (ECtHR) (1958)  X  Morphed role? 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) (1979)  X  Morphed role? 
African Court of Peoples and Human Rights (ACtPHR) 
(2005) 
 X   
International Criminal Courts     
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) (1993) 
 X   
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)  
(1994) 
 X   
International Criminal Court (ICC) (2002)  X   
General jurisdiction & Other**     
International Court of Justice (ICJ) (1945) X    
International Tribunal for the Law of the Seas (ITLOS) 
(1996) 
X  Seabed 
Authority 
 











* The ECOWAS court also has a human rights jurisdiction and the CCJ can hear appeals where countries have consented to let the 
CCJ replace the Privy Council.  
**General jurisdiction covers any case states choose to bring. The jurisdiction of the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Seas, however, will only cover disputes pertaining to the Law of the Seas. 
 
We can see that most of the ICs with dispute settlement authority (15 of 19) have also 
been delegated other roles; most ICs in economic systems have been delegated multiple roles, 
whereas ICs in human rights and criminal law systems were only delegated an enforcement role; 
ICs with administrative and constitutional review authority have been delegated more than one 
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role and are mostly located in economic systems with supranational administrators and 
legislative actors; and nine of the ten ICs that have been delegated a constitutional review role 
also have an administrative review role.  
 
III. The Theoretical Pay off from Considering ICs Multiple Roles 
I am interested in the multiple roles ICs play because it allows us to appreciate the many 
different contributions ICs make to international politics. ICs do oversee state compliance with 
international agreements, but this is not all they do. Wherever there are common regulatory rules 
that are to be applied transnationally, policy-makers worry about rules being interpreted and 
applied differentially across borders. Wherever there are supranational administrators making 
binding decisions, lawyers and policy-makers worry about how to monitor the international 
actors to ensure basic competence and as a check against institutional capture. International 
systems of administrative review are designed to address these concerns. National legislatures 
and states in federal systems worry that their sovereign rights may be usurped when the 
executive operates through international institutions. Human rights advocates and national judges 
worry about unchecked international authority. International constitutional review helps to 
address these concerns. And dispute settlement does more than resolve legal ambiguities; it 
transfers private litigant complaints about broken promises to a venue where disinterested actors 
can investigate the charges and hopefully create some legal finality to the dispute.  How do we 
translate these insights to theoretical debates about international courts and international politics?   
This section uses the four IC roles to shine light on two different scholarly debates: 1) 
whether it makes sense to see ICs as agents of states or trustees of the law, and 2) whether certain 
legal designs contribute to IC independence, and thereby spur IC activism.  Examining the 
multiple roles of ICs in some respects complicates these debates in that there is no longer a 
single answer to the question.  But it also helps move beyond the disagreeing camps by showing 
the conditions under which the different arguments gain resonance.  
   
ICs as Agents or Trustees? 
Scholars disagree as to whether international courts should be seen as agents of states or 
trustees of the law they oversee. Those who see ICs as state’s agents suggest that states are the 
primary actors shaping IC decision-making, using the threat of relegislation, sanction or 
noncompliance to decisively influence judicial decision-making (Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla 
2008;  Garrett, Kelemen, and Schulz 1998;  Garrett and Weingast 1993;  Stephan 2002).  Those 
who see ICs as trustees stress the political autonomy that ICs have, arguing that ICs operate in a 
realm of rhetorical politics where state sanctioning tools are of little practical relevance (Alter 
2008a;  Stone Sweet 2002).11  It is interesting to note that this is primarily an international 
relations debate, reflecting the state-centric perspective that dominates international relations 
scholarship (Hawkins, Nielson, Tierney, and Lake 2006). Judicial politics scholars are more 
likely to consider how a broad range of factors influence judicial outcomes, such as the party in 
power, the party that appointed the judge, the perspective of powerful interest groups, legal 
traditions etc. (Staton and Moore 2011). American politics and public administration scholars are 
also less likely to be committed to the idea that states are privileged principals, and more willing 
                                                
11 Trustee comes from the common law practice of trusts, where property is held on behalf of a beneficiary and 
overseen by a designated trustee who has a legal obligation to follow the rules of the trust and act in the best interest 
of the beneficiary. There are also scholars who give equal weight to law and political factors as they consider how 
international judges operate within a zone of discretion (Ginsburg 2005;  Steinberg 2002, 2004). 
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to conceive of judges as monitors used by governments to watch over the behavior of others 
(Kelemen 2011;  McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989).  
The multiple roles of ICs help us to nuance although perhaps not entirely resolve the 
disagreement. Courts can play both self-binding and other-binding roles.  In other-binding 
judicial roles, courts may well be the agents of states. In self-binding roles, however, courts are 
trustees of the law. I use a stylized narrative from the domestic context to explain how courts can 
be both other-binding and self-binding institutions.   
In earlier times and in smaller societies there was no delegation to judges; Chiefs and 
Kings both made law and served as the interpreters of the law. As territories grew, delegation of 
interpretive authority became unavoidable.  Sovereign actors – those with the authority to make 
law – primarily delegated dispute settlement authority, the power to make a decision about a 
controversy or a dispute. While sovereign actors were ceding authority to interpret the law, they 
were not themselves subject to the interpretations of their judges, mainly because no judge would 
presume to know better than the Sovereign what the law meant.  This delegation was other-
binding:  Sovereigns were subjecting others to judicial interpretations of the law. As the state 
apparatus grew, the role of judges grew.  Cases still appeared as controversies judges were asked 
to resolve, but when the subject of cases became state actors, judges ended up in a monitoring 
and enforcing role, reviewing whether the Sovereign’s other agents (e.g. tax collectors, local 
rulers, state administrators, etc.) were faithfully following the Sovereign’s laws.  Neither type of 
delegation – dispute settlement or monitoring and enforcing – bound the Sovereign so long as the 
Sovereign himself was never subjected to the authority of the court.  
Thus far I have only considered delegation in an authoritarian context, where the supreme 
leader both makes and enforces the law. Constitutional democracy differs from authoritarian rule 
in that it is premised on the notion of a social contract between leaders and their people.  From a 
social contract perspective, government acts legitimately only when citizens can select their 
rulers and when governments respect the rule of law. Developments in constitutional democracy 
led to self-binding delegation wherein branches of government agreed to limit their powers by 
binding themselves to the authority of others, including to the authority of courts.12 When 
Sovereigns use courts to monitor their agents, as occurs in the administrative review role, 
delegation to courts remains primarily other-binding.  When Sovereigns use courts to check their 
exercise of power, courts help ensure governmental respect of the social compact. 
At the domestic level, it is especially easy to see how delegating different judicial roles 
binds the sovereign in different ways. Courts playing a dispute settlement role, hearing private 
litigant cases, mostly bind others by bringing state law into the resolution of private disputes. In 
administrative review, a judge checks the legal validity of the decisions, actions, and non-actions 
of public administrative actors, who themselves rely on delegated authority. Administrative 
actors may find themselves constrained, but that is the point of subjecting administrative 
authority to judicial oversight. Thus this role remains primarily other-binding, a tool of the 
legislatures to police the behavior of administrative actors. Self-binding occurs in the 
enforcement and constitutional review roles. In the enforcement role, a judge monitors police and 
prosecutors as they use the state’s coercive power. Force can only be legitimately used against 
citizens when it is lawful. Constitutional review checks whether the law created by legislatures 
or interpreted and applied by executive branch actors, or both, cohere with the constitution. 
These last two roles are pretty much always self-binding and sovereignty compromising, but they 
                                                
12 Of course this binding is somewhat fictitious, since the self-binding could be undone through a new constitutional 
act (see Elster 2000). 
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also help to reinforce the legitimacy of the Sovereign’s actions by suggesting that the Sovereign 
is respecting the social compact.   
The international level is different than the domestic level in that ICs are often ruling on 
the actions of sovereign states and their agents. This means that we must amend the above 
discussion of how judicial roles implicate state autonomy.  It is still the case that dispute 
settlement and administrative review roles primarily bind others while enforcement and 
constitutional review roles are primarily self-binding for governments.  But circumstances can 
arise in each role that will lead ICs to be issuing interpretations that impinge on national 
autonomy. Figure 4 below captures how delegation to ICs has both self-binding and other 
binding dimensions. Because all boxes on the table above are filled, it may look like ICs are 
binding states as much as they are binding others. But this would only be true if the number of 
cases in each box were equal and thus if ICs spent as much time reviewing state compliance with 
international rules as they did fulfilling the many other-binding tasks they have been delegated.  
The larger point is that even in the international realm, delegation to courts has both self-
binding and other-binding dimensions, each of which is animated by a different logic and results 
in different politics (Alter 2008a,b). Our preoccupation with national sovereignty often obscures 
from conversation the useful other-binding roles of ICs, and that self-binding is both intentional 
and often desirable.  
Figure 4: Delegation to ICs Reflecting Other-binding and Self-binding Logics  
 Other-binding situations Self-binding situations 
Dispute Settlement  
Jurisdiction to hear disputes among 
contracting parties. 
Compulsory dispute settlement for 
transborder disputes between private 
litigants (e.g. OHADA cases).  
 
Compulsory dispute settlement 
between IOs and private contractors 
(found in many IOs). 
Inter-state dispute settlement. When 
non-compulsory, states control which 
cases reach the IC. Compulsory 
dispute settlement easily morphs into 
the enforcement role. 
Enforcement  
Jurisdiction to declare state 
noncompliance with the law. 
Ad hoc criminal courts set up by the 
Security Council to prosecute war 
crimes in specific conflicts (ICTY and 
ICTR). 
Most international enforcement 
authority (trade, human rights, war 
crimes). 
Administrative Review  
Jurisdiction to review of decisions 
of administrative actors to ensure 
procedural regularity and respect 
for the confines of administrative 
authority. 
Review of administrative decisions of 
IO actors (ITLOS, ECJ, ATJ and 
others). 
Review of the national application of 
international rules (BCJ, ECJ, ATJ 
and others). 
Constitutional Review 
Jurisdiction to invalidate ultra-vires 
acts of legislative and executive 
bodies on the basis of a conflict with 
a higher order legal requirement. 
Review of the legality of IO actions 
(ECJ, ATJ and others). 
Review of the legality of state actions 
(morphed judicial enforcement roles). 
 
The fact that delegation to ICs can be both self- and other-binding has implications for 
the debate on how compliance concerns shape IC decision-making. In the many places where 
international legal bodies primarily bind others to follow the law, the interests of ICs and 
powerful state-principals are likely to align so that the debate about whether or not ICs must be 
concerned about sanctions or compliance with their rulings is largely irrelevant. For example, a 
coding of every preliminary ruling case sent to the Andean Tribunal of Justice revealed very few 
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cases where governments intervened to defend a government policy because most cases involved 
administrative review of decisions applying Andean intellectual property laws, which 
governments generally supported (Helfer and Alter 2009;  Helfer, Alter, and Guerzovich 2009). 
Compliance is perhaps more of a concern in constitutional cases and international enforcement 
cases, although governments may also be happy to let ICs shoulder the blame of angering 
domestic groups. All of this is to say that compliance is not necessarily the concern that 
international relations scholars expect it to be, which means that threats of noncompliance are 
not necessarily the political resource that political scientists presume it to be. None of this speaks 
to whether ICs take into account the legal arguments of governments.  But does it really make 
sense to presume that without compliance concerns and sanctioning threats judges would 
systematically ignore the insight, opinions and legal arguments of policymakers?   
There is more at stake in this debate than whether or not ICs are controlled by states. The 
larger point of contention is whether international judges are able to build and exercise legal and 
political authority. If ICs are mere agents of states, providing useful information and constructing 
focal points but nonetheless beholden to the inflexible national interest concerns of governments, 
there will be very little that international law and international courts can do to influence 
international politics (Goldsmith and Posner 2005;  Posner and Yoo 2005).  But if international 
courts have sufficient autonomy to rule against powerful governments and by so doing seriously 
call into question the legality of government actions, then there is significant room for 
international law to be a tool to influence international organizations and governments (Brunnée 
and Toope 2010;  Goodman and Jinks 2004), and for litigation to become a way through which 
legal understandings shift and political change occurs (Alter 2011b). 
 
International Judicial Roles and IC Design 
Related to the debate about whether ICs are agents of states is the question of how the 
design of international legal institutions affects IC independence.  Eric Posner and John Yoo 
argue that ICs that lack compulsory jurisdiction are more dependent on states wanting to use 
them. This dependence, they argue, leads ICs to work harder to please governments, especially 
the governments of powerful states (Posner and Yoo 2005). While much of Posner and Yoo’s 
analysis is controversial,13 most agree that ICs with compulsory jurisdiction are in fact more 
independent, for the reasons Posner and Yoo suggest. At this point, however, most ICs have 
compulsory jurisdiction and they allow non-state actors to initiate litigation.14 If Posner and Yoo 
are right that IC design determines IC dependence on states, and if we presume, as most 
international relations scholars do, that states prioritize their control of international actors, then 
we must wonder why states repeatedly consent to ICs with designs that compromise IC 
dependence on states? 
                                                
13 The controversial part of Posner and Yoo’s analysis is their claim that dependent ICs will be more effective than 
independent ICs. It is surely true that where states can block legal proceedings, the only disputes that will be 
litigated are those where the state is willing to let the IC determine the legal outcome. For this reason alone, 
compliance with IC rulings is likely to be higher. Most scholars, however, do not see compliance as a useful 
measurement of IC effectiveness (Raustiala 2000; von Stein, this volume; Martin, this volume).  Helfer and 
Slaughter (2005) offer a comprehensive critique of Posner and Yoo’s arguments. 
14 Only three ICs out of twenty-five that lack compulsory jurisdiction—the International Court of Justice, the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Seas, and the African Court of People and Human Rights. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights also relies on states opting in to its compulsory jurisdiction, but at this point 
twenty-four Latin American countries have opted in and withdrawal is extremely unlikely so that the Inter-American 
Court increasingly operates under the assumption that is jurisdiction is compulsory (Romano 2007: 820-1). 
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The four roles help us understand this IC design puzzle. The design of ICs can vary by 
judicial role. A functional analysis of IC design presumes that states would design ICs to play the 
roles they delegate to them so that certain judicial roles would bring with them certain IC 
designs. From a functional design perspective, we should not be surprised when ICs have the 
design features they need to credibly play their delegated roles. If the IC lacks the design 
elements needed for a given role, then one must wonder if states actually intend the IC to play 
the role. Where IC designs exceed the design features associated with a role, increasing access to 
the system and the remedies-associated roles, we might want to know more about when and why 
governments are enhancing the design of an IC.  Figure 5 below identifies design features 
associated with each role. These features are explained more fully in the study from which this 
chapter is drawn (Alter, forthcoming). Any IC design that falls into the light grey column 
corresponds to functional features needed if an IC is to credibly play its designated role.  The 
figure also identifies typical enhancements one finds in busier ICs that arguably help it play its 
role, and constraints that one often finds in less busy ICs, which usually reflect an effort to 
maintain control over the legal process. This discussion and coding of IC design is static, 
obscuring the fact that at least seven ICs, including the most active and politically relevant ICs 
today, have been reformed over time to remove constraints and add enhancements (Alter 2011a). 
Moreover, one should not equate the existence of enhancements and constraints with the 
functional effectiveness of such design features. The COMESA legal system has the widest 
formal access rules of any IC, but litigants never seem to invoke the COMESA system to 
challenge illegal polices.  The ECOWAS system has mechanisms to add sanctions for 
noncompliance, but they have never been used.  And in practice the formal requirement that the 
Dispute Settlement Body endorse WTO panel and appellate body decisions does not serve as a 
meaningful political check on WTO legal decision-making.  
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Figure 5: Design Features for Judicial Roles 
 Basic functional design elements   
Role Compulsory 
jurisdiction 
Access to initiate 
litigation 
Remedies Potential design 
enhancements  
Potential political 
constraints .Dispute	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have failed to 
act. 
Compensation for 




mechanism so that 
private actors can 
raise challenges in 
local courts. 
Requiring that 
governments bring cases 
on behalf of their citizens 
in lieu of allowing direct 
access to the court. 
 
Constitutional	  













units need to be 
able to challenge 
ultra-vires actions 
otherwise there is 
no real check 
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Only states can challenge 
legality of international 
acts. 
 
The functional argument expects that ICs with enforcement, administrative and 
constitutional review powers will have compulsory jurisdiction, and that ICs with administrative 
review roles will also have private access. Figure 6 identifies the design of ICs within each 
judicial role, focusing on the features associated with “new style” ICs. Access refers to whether 
non-state actors have standing to initiate a dispute. Grey boxes highlight the functionally 
required design criteria.  If judicial role drives the design of the IC, we should not find it 
surprising if the grey boxes are marked with an “X.”  White boxes with an “X” represent a 
design enhancement feature. The evidence in support of the functional argument comes via 
correlation. If function were not related to design, we would expect the rules for access and 
compulsory jurisdiction to be more randomly distributed, as opposed to clustered by role. Instead 
we can see that ICs with enforcement, administrative and constitutional review roles are more 
 18 
likely to have the minimum design features of compulsory jurisdiction and access for non-state 
actors to initiate litigation.  It thus seems plausible that the extension of multiple roles to ICs may 
account at least in part for the trend towards new-style ICs.   
Of course nearly all ICs today have compulsory jurisdiction, and more than half allow 
non-state actors to initiate litigation.  We might thus think that something else explains this trend.  
But we can also see greater variation in IC designs with respect to design features that are not 
functionally required.  The grant of private access for dispute settlement and enforcement roles is 
far more limited. While many enforcement and constitutional review systems allow 
supranational actors to initiate litigation, few administrative review and dispute settlement 
systems permit these actors to initiate litigation. This suggests that IC design is being varied 
because of functional requirements, and not because of a greater or lesser desire to create active 
and independent ICs. 
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Figure 6: IC Design and Judicial Roles (organized alphabetically) 
 
Judicial Role & Minimum 
Design Criteria 
ICs with this role  Compulsory 
jurisdiction 




ASEAN X X *  
ATJ X X *  
CACJ X X X Community officials 
CCJ X X Case by case  
CEMAC X X *  
COMESA X X *  
EACJ X X *  
ECCIS Unclear X   
Dispute settlement 
Jurisdiction to hear disputes 
among contracting parties. 
 
 
ECJ X X *  
 ECOWAS X X * The Commission 
 EFTAC X X Limited  
 ICJ Optional protocol X  Advisory opinions only 
 ITLOS Optional protocol X   
 MERCOSUR X X   
 OHADA X Advisory 
opinions only 
X  
 SADC X X X Community officials 
 WTO X X   
 WAEMU X X   
ASEAN X X   
ACtHPR Optional Protocol X  Commission 
ATJ X X X Secretariat 
CACJ X X X Community Institutions 
CEMAC X X X Any Community Organ 
COMESA X X Via national 
courts 
Secretary General 
EACJ X X X Secretary General 
ECtHR X X X  
ECJ X X Via national 
courts 
Commission 
ECOWAS X X Human rights 
only 
Executive Secretary 
EFTAC X   Surveillance Authority 
IACtHR Optional protocol X  Commission 
ICC X   Prosecutor 
ICTY X   Prosecutor 
ICTR X   Prosecutor 
MERCOSUR X X   
SADC X X X  




Jurisdiction to declare state 




Functional design criteria: 
Compulsory Jurisdiction 
 
Human rights and war 
crimes system arguably 




Supranational Prosecutor or 
state initiation of 
litigation. Sometimes 
private litigant access to 
initiate litigation 
WTO X X   
ATJ X X X  
BCJ X X Via national 
courts 
 
CACJ X X X Any community organ 
CCJ X X X  
CEMAC X X X Any community organ 
COMESA X X X  
EACJ X  X  
ECJ X  X  
ECOWAS X X X  
Administrative Review  
Jurisdiction to review of 
decisions of administrative 
actors to ensure procedural 
regulatory and respect for 
the confines of  
administrative authority. 
 
Functional design criteria: 
Compulsory Jurisdiction 
Private Access EFTAC X X X  
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ITLOS X X X   
WAEMU X X Via national 
courts 
 
Judicial Role & Minimum 
Design Criteria 
ICs with this Role  Compulsory 
Jurisdiction 




Constitutional Review  ATJ X X X General Secretariat 
CACJ X X X Any community organ 
CCJ Optional Protocol  X  
CEMAC X X X Any community organ 
COMESA X X X  
EACJ X X X Advisory opinions only 
ECJ X X X Any community organ 
ECOWAS X X  Any community organ 
SADC X X X Any community organ 
Jurisdiction to invalidate 
acts of legislative and 
executive bodies on the 
basis of a conflict with a 
higher order legal 
requirement.  
 
Functional design criteria: 
Compulsory Jurisdiction 
Access for participants in 





WAEMU X X X Any community organ 
 
Grey indicates the design is functionally required for the role. White boxes with an “X” exceed the functional design 
requirement. I note advisory opinions, but these are generally excluded from this analysis. 
 




The coding raises many questions, but it does confirm the functional argument. The only 
exceptions where design does not seem to correlate with function are the Inter-American and 
African Court of Human Rights where political constraints still hinder the body’s enforcement 
capacities, and the CCJ’s constitutional role, which is quirky because the CCJ’s constitutional 
role is designed to replace the role of the Commonwealth Privy Council. But we also find many 
enhancements, which suggests that the functional analysis under-explains the design trend.  
Why does it matter if function shapes IC design? Many scholars have hypothesized how 
the design of ICs affects legal outcomes. Posner and Yoo (2005: 6-7) expect compulsory 
jurisdiction and private access to lead to more judicial activism and less state support for a legal 
system, whereas Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter (2000) expect international legal systems 
where nonstate actors can influence the selection, access and implementation of dispute 
settlement to generate more litigation, greater compliance with IC rulings, and the deepening and 
widening of legalization. Stone Sweet (1999) also expects that where interested parties are able 
to instigate litigation the result will be more judicial lawmaking and Helfer and Slaughter (1997) 
expect that private access will increase the effectiveness of international legal mechanisms.  If IC 
design is an artifact of judicial role, however, then the link between IC design and legal outcome 
may not be as direct as scholars have hypothesized. For example, one finds compulsory 
jurisdiction and private access associated with international administrative review system and in 
all but one international constitutional review system.  But my best sense of the data is that one 
does not find accusations of activist judges in all or even most ICs with administrative and 
constitutional review authority.   
It could be that the theories are more applicable to IC enforcement roles. Scholars often 
want to see every review of state action as a form of enforcement. Such a perspective subsumes 
the notion that governments often choose to use courts to monitor actors within their own states 
(Kelemen 2011), eliminating entirely the category of other-binding delegation and reinforcing 
the idea that government and ICs are mostly in an antagonistic relationship. Still, we do not find 
that IC design shapes judicial law-making in the way that the theories expect. Reviewing the 
universe of operational ICs reveals that courts with similar designs – like the COMESA, 
CEMAC, CACJ, ATJ, SADC courts which share the design of the ECJ and the ECtHR, and the 
MERCOSUR and ASEAN system that share the design of the WTO – do not share a record for 
legal activity or judicial law-making.  Other factors could be important in shaping judicial law-
making (Ginsburg 2005;  Steinberg 2002). The larger point is that IC design may be mostly an 
artifact of judicial role, and for this reason less shaping of legal and political outcomes than 
scholars anticipate. 
IV. International Courts and Democratic Politics 
Scholars tend to approach the subject of international adjudication with a single example 
in mind – either a single role, single case or a single legal regime. This contribution has 
attempted to broaden our perspective on the role of international courts and international politics 
by broadly comparing the different roles that ICs have been delegated and in fact are playing 
around the world today. The multiple roles of ICs reveal that ICs do not exist solely to 
compromise national sovereignty. Delegation to ICs does undermine any individual 
government’s ability to define what international agreements require, and it creates a rival actor 
– the IC – that is authorized to define the meaning of international law in concrete cases. But ICs 
also can be protective of state sovereignty. In their administrative and constitutional review roles, 
ICs provide checks on the exercise of supranational authority. Administrative review can also 
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help states to defend themselves against private actors that charge them with bias or political 
interference in the application of law. 
The multiple roles of ICs also help nuance conversations about what makes ICs agents of 
states, and about whether delegation to ICs undermines domestic democracy. If ICs were pure 
agents of nation-states, then ICs would be unlikely to deviate from what governments want 
which might be protective of domestic democracy.15 But I argued that ICs can also act as trustees 
of the law in certain circumstances. As trustees of the law, ICs can help to ensure that 
supranational governance and supranational administrators do not exceed the social contract of 
the international institution. IC trustees can also, however, interpret the law in ways that the 
consenting nation-states never intended and that democratic majorities might dislike (Alter 
2008a).  We need to remember that constitutional review and enforcement roles are intended to 
create checks on sovereign power. The point of international war crimes and human rights 
statutes is to bar punishing noncombatants no matter how politically popular such actions may 
be. But where international legal institutions help transnational legal interests trump domestic 
interests, international law and IC trustees may be seen as a threat to democracy.  In this light, 
domestic constitutional provisions that limit the legal status of international law and IC rulings 
may be the remedy needed to protect national democracy.  
I have focused here on the roles states have delegated to ICs, not on whether and under 
what conditions ICs end up playing their designated roles. The focus on mandate helps us define 
a baseline from which we can then explore what leads ICs to inhabit a delegated role.  We should 
investigate further how enhancements help and constraints hinder an IC’s ability to play its 
delegated roles. We should also investigate why ICs with similar designs are invoked more or 
less frequently than we might expect, and thus how context and features woven into the fabric of 
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